Economic and Social Frustration

Appeal to Ethnic Myth

One of the primary tools utilized by both regimes to legitimize their ethnic rule was an appeal to a particular ethnic history or nationalist myth. These were used to form the ideological bases under which the regimes operated and carried out their discriminatory practices. In addition, they created a psychological fervor that motivated the population to support and take part in these actions.

In Rwanda there exists considerable debate over the country's history and the importance of ethnic distinctions. Each version is an attempt to rationalize the rule of a particular ethnic class.

For example, in respect to the history of relations between the ethnicities, the Tutsis assert that in the precolonial past, Tutsi and Hutu lived in harmony with one another. European colonialism created the ethnic divisions and ended the social mobility of the past. In respect to the Rwandan revolution of 1959, Tutsis say that external actors (Belgian authorities and the Catholic Church) switched support from the Tutsis to the Hutus and were responsible for the reversal of power relations and subsequent political violence.

The Hutu government that ruled Rwanda from 1961 until 1994 asserts different views of the past. In respect to past ethnic relations, they say that clever Tutsi conquered the Hutu. The Tutsi then proceeded to oppress, exploit, and hold the Hutu in servitude. In respect to the 1959 Revolution, they say that it was Hutu rural leaders who enacted the revolution to end discrimination against them in employment, education, access to political power, and economic advancement. Hutu rural grievances were caused by the Tutsi, and the revolution was a response to this.

None of these accounts of history reflect a truthful interpretation of the complex historical factors that shaped the events described; rather, they reflect political positions more than truthful history. In addition, a racist ideology (introduced by Europeans) stated that the groups were racially, historically, and culturally different and the Tutsi were superior in intelligence and political ability. It is then easy to see how the Hutu account was used during their reign to justify their political power and how it was easy to evoke Hutu hatred toward the Tutsi. After a history of oppression, discrimination, and dual colonial rule, the Hutu were poised for revenge.

For 45 years after World War II, the Serbs existed in relative peace in the multiethnic state of Yugoslavia. Why then, in the late 1980s into the 1990s, was there a sudden surge of Serbian ethnic pride and hatred toward the other regional ethnicities? Part of the answer lies in Milosevic's technique of appealing to a nationalist historical myth which he used to rally the population along political ethnic lines.

In 1991 Milosevic adopted the concept of a "Greater Serbia." This is a Serbian expansionist policy that dates back to the political nationalist Ilija Garasanin in 1844. Garasanin outlined the steps necessary to cut out a larger Serbian state from the surrounding Slav, Ottoman, and Albanian territories. The roots of this expansionism can be traced back further to a Serbian national mythology about the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. In this myth Kosovo was lost to the Turks because the Serbs preferred moral salvation to military victory, but through long term commitment, it's restoration was promised. "The Kosovo myth provided the Serbs with a feeling of superiority over their neighbors as well as a sense that higher destiny had ordained them to become the dominant power in the Balkans." This myth was retained for centuries and it was turned into a modern classic when Rebecca West wrote a book about it in 1941. Milosevic unearthed this deep-rooted ethnic nationalism and used it for his own political advantages. Here is an example of the power and effect this ethnic nationalism had on the Serbian population. When Slobodan Milosevic met opposition in Belgrade, even the celebrated student riots against the regime in March 1991 were distinguished by their nationalist rhetoric. "When the young rioters threw stones at the police, they would shout at them: 'Go to Kosovo.' What offended them was precisely that the Serbian police were being employed against Serbs, as opposed to their obvious target of the Kosovar Albanians."

Like the Rwandan case it is difficult to blame the regime entirely for bringing about strong feelings of ethnic identity. Just as these social ethnic distinctions existed in Rwanda prior to their politicization, so did they exist in Serbia for centuries as well; however, it is my assertion that by intentionally bringing these ethnicities into a political nationalist forum, they became magnified ten-fold and escalated to genocidal proportions.
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Economic and Social Frustration

Another parallel between the politicization of ethnicity in Rwanda and Serbia was the use of ethnic lines to draw in support from economically and socially frustrated peoples. In both countries, leaders linked economic and social discontent to ethnic oppression.

In Rwanda, it was easy to project certain economic and social dissatisfaction as the result of ethnic inequality. This played right into the hands of the Hutu leaders in the 1959 revolution. A Hutu counterelite took advantage of rural grievances and articulated discontent with the regime. This led to more radical action and hate toward the all Tutsi government. This hate was further emphasized in the social spectrum by the fact that Hutus had been discriminated against in employment, education, and access to political power. These Hutu frustrations, coupled with the fact the government was Tutsi-led, made it easy for the Hutus to blame the Tutsis as the source of their problems.
The Hutus contained a large majority of the population, but were frustrated of being subjected to the rule of the minority Tutsi. In a similar manner in Serbia, the once dominant ethnic Serbs, found themselves a frustrated minority in regions such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia. Serbs in Kosovo began seeing themselves as victims of crimes by Albanians. Frustrations turned into fears and, along with worsening economic conditions, Milosevic was able to channel these feelings into his political goals and draw support along these ethnic lines. He presented himself as the defender of the "oppressed" Serbs and gained popular support throughout Yugoslavia.

In both cases, the regime seeking to grab power successfully made a direct link between their frustrated conditions and ethnic oppression. Thus, not only did it draw in the support of these peoples, but at the same time it began to fuel the ethnic hate that would later manifest itself into genocide.
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Control of Media and Hate Propaganda

It is clear that one of the main drives behind the escalation of ethnic hatred to the level of genocide is the control of the media. The media is the supreme communicating force in the modern political world, it's messages reach into every crevice of society. It is the ultimate tool of persuasion in authoritarian countries where the state controls a one-sided media. Although in somewhat different forms, this was the case in both Serbia and Rwanda. Both countries utilized this tool to broaden their ethnic politics by rallying support from the population and using it to carry out its ethnic policies.

In Rwanda, radio broadcast was the primary method used to communicate to the population. The Hutu regime used their control of the national radio to push an ideology portraying Tutsis as foreign interlopers who were "just too damn smart and too damn clever." A parallel was drawn with the way Jews were portrayed by fascists in pre-war Europe. Hutu - Tutsi distinctions were exaggerated and exploited for political gain. A pirate radio station of the Hutu regime, Radio des Milles Collines, played a leading role in the 1994 genocide. Broadcasts, along with posters and leaflets, incited people with slogans such as "hate your neighbor," "kill your neighbor," and that Tutsis are "snakes, cockroaches, and animals." The extremists in the government used propaganda to turn would-be moderates into extremists as well.

In a poor country such as Rwanda, the economy had little to offer to young Rwandans, the only possibility many had was to join the militia. Thus, the young Hutu militia grew rapidly and the members of the militia underwent three weeks of intensive indoctrination where the main theme was hatred against the Tutsis. In addition, inflammatory political speeches such as one delivered in 1992 by Leon Mugesera (a militia official) added to the growing crisis. He urged Hutus to kill Tutsis and dump their bodies in the rivers. In Rwanda, there existed no free media, or any objective form of media at all for that matter. Thus, the regime had total control of all information in the country.

In a somewhat different circumstance, but roughly the same manner, Milosevic's regime had almost total control of the media in Serbia as well. Radio Television Serbia, RTS, was Milosevic's primary propaganda machine. "By any standard, the RTS news operation was a joke." Yet this is where most Serbs got their news. It portrayed Serbs as being unfairly picked on by their neighbors in the Balkans and by those in the West. Although not as vicious as the rhetoric used in Rwanda, this parallels the historical propaganda issued by the Hutus about being discriminated against by the Tutsi. In addition, even though the state did not have complete control of the media in the more advanced Serbia, "Milosevic made it clear that the media had only two roles: They were either the unseen enemies he must crush or the tools he would use to cement his plans and policies." Thus, here it is again evident that the regimes in Serbia and Rwanda utilized the media toward the same ends - to distribute propaganda and to implement its ethnic policies.
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Marginalization of Moderates

In the efforts of Rwanda and Serbia to draw political support on the basis of ethnicity, political moderates were seen as a threat. The principles of inclusion and working together with differing ethnic groups opposed the ideals of the ethnic nationalist state. Thus, both regimes sought to push aside moderate political power.

In Rwanda in the 1950s and in the 1990s there were brave voices of opposition that called for inclusiveness, the restructuring of power relations, and the need to attend to all Rwandans, with ethnic background put aside. These were heavy demands in a time when Hutus and Tutsis were developing extreme hates for one another. Therefore, when hardliners on both sides made an ethnic appeal, they easily marginalized the moderate political voices. In the 1990s these moderate individuals were murdered.

In Serbia, Milosevic's socialist regime used their control of elections to ensure that they maintained a continued grip on power. The opposition faced the choice between participating in elections, in which they probably would be defeated, or boycotting the elections in which case they would risk political marginalization. Thus, opposition parties were trapped between being pushed aside and accepting defeat in the elections.
Just as Rwanda used physical violence against opposition moderates, so did Serbia. Serbian Movement for Renewal party leader Vuk Draskovic was arrested and beaten in custody after demonstrating against the regime. In addition, Serbian Premier Milan Panic (1992) and President Dobrica Cosic (1993) were both ousted from their posts for advocating more moderate views and challenging Milosevic's policies.
For a while, Serbia was not a multiparty political system, but when pluralism did become present in Serbia in 1990, the three opposition parties were also strongly nationalistic. This provides an interesting point for both cases. It shows the level to which the ethnic nationalism had succeeded. The population and politics had become so caught up in it, that there was literally no room left for moderation. Sure, "opposition" parties existed in Serbia, but they were certainly far from moderate. Thus, the strength the ethnic national drive had accumulated made it impossible for moderation to even exist. In Rwanda, such extreme ethnic identity resulted in similar consequences.
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Authoritarian Control of the Judicial System

The final ingredient for genocide shared by both countries was the deliberate lack of judicial effectiveness. In Serbia and in Rwanda the authoritative regimes maintained control of the judicial and legal factions of the state and could therefore use or not use them at will.

While this essentially resulted in the same affect in both countries, it operated on different levels in each. In Serbia this was used to legitimize the actions and policies undertaken by the government. Elimination of opposition activities was "clothed in the language of legality." This was because there was nothing to fear from the judiciary, one of the regimes "commanding heights." Serbia was "a country where the laws had fallen silent." The socialist party controlled key appointments in the judiciary. Serbia did not have balance of power separation between the executive and judicial that is present in the United States. As a result, Milosevic's regime had free reign to do whatever it wanted and would still be able to "clothe" it in the language of legality.

The same lack of judicial and legal effectiveness was present in Rwanda, but it operated on more of an individual basis. The Hutu government deliberately let hate crimes go unpunished in a culture of impunity. The Rwandan legal system was held hostage by the racist regime and the president named his cronies as judges and magistrates. Ethnic attacks and violent crimes, including rape and murder, were not punished. By not punishing those responsible for hate crimes, it hungered extremists for more, and sent a message of terror to the minority Tutsi.

Unchecked ethnic aggressions, at the state and at the individual level, piled upon one another and eventually led to an indirect legitimization of their actions. In both countries, the absence of juridical authority opened the final door that allowed the politics of ethnicity to spiral out of control.
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