Despite the implementation of many safeguards and the desire for nonproliferation by the United States, France detonated their first nuclear weapon in 1960. Developed independently and against the will of the superpowers, the need to prevent others from doing the same grew urgent, especially since a number of states were actively involved in their own nuclear weapon research. Therefore, in 1968, a multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was proposed by the United Stated, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation. With 188 states currently party to the treaty, it serves as the only binding commitment of states to disarmament and prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. Before the NPT, the safeguard system, as explained in INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 , only applied to those materials and facilities that were voluntarily designated by the state, or had been required by the supplier. Under the NPT, a new safeguards system was established, to be enforced by the IAEA through inspections. The purpose of the inspections is to prevent non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) from developing nuclear explosive devices. In addition, the IAEA, with the release of INFCIRC/153 , adopted all of the safeguards found within the NPT. This forced all NPT states to place all nuclear activity in the state under IAEA safeguards. The drafting of INFCIRC/153, and the supplementation of it by INFCIRC/540 to expand the rights of the inspectors, has been called "the most significant point in the history of safeguards." In effect, there are essentially two safeguards systems within the IAEA. The main difference between the policies set out by INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 and INFCIRC/153 is that the latter sets out detection goals with explicit objectives, while the former is merely an agent to verify safeguard compliance with the nuclear undertakings of the state.

The safeguards of the IAEA are only enforced on the NNWS, which some critics feel is unfair. The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) of the United States, UK, France, Russia and China all operate voluntarily under the safeguard system, but many feel that the IAEA is responsible for making sure that safeguards are implemented in all matters relating to nuclear energy. Despite these restrictions, obvious progress has been made by the international atomic community through the NPT, seen both by the ending of the nuclear arms race and the steady process of disarmament by the superpowers. The responsibilities placed on the IAEA by the NPT are large, and sometimes difficult to enforce. This brings to forefront the matter of the effectiveness of the IAEA in enforcing the safeguards and guidelines set forth by the NPT, and in essence, the effectiveness of the IAEA itself.

One of the primary problems facing the IAEA is simply the need to reconcile the differences between NPT states and the non-NPT states. Being a member state of the IAEA does not require acceptance or ratification of the NPT, and thereby, differences are created. India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, among others, initially refused to sign the NPT, saying it was discriminatory to NNWS and that forgoing a nuclear weapons program for vague promises of future arms control is unfair. This continues to be a source of contention, due to the fact that up until 1990, the superpowers pursued an uninterrupted arms race while continuing to prevent other states from acquiring them. With the end of the Cold War, a policy of disarmament is being pursued, but the existence of nuclear arms continues to force some states (Israel, India, Pakistan, and Cuba) to refuse to comply with NPT and IAEA obligations. This occurs even after the NWS have invited the IAEA to place safeguards on all (US, UK) or some (France, Russia, China) of their peaceful nuclear facilities.

The non-NPT states also place heavy emphasis on the NATO collaboration and the availability of nuclear weapons to NNWS that are allies with the United States. As members of NATO and NWS, the US, the UK and France all have nuclear arms available to them. In addition, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey all have planes equipped with US nuclear bombs. This raises many voices of contention, the loudest of which is the fact NNWS possess nuclear weapons. However, the weapons remain under the control of the President of the US. A major hurdle for the IAEA is the reluctance of the NWS, especially the United States, to place its nuclear weapons program under the watch of the IAEA.

Another problem facing the IAEA is the idea of a "problem NPT state", one which chooses to embark on a program of nuclear weapons research, a clear violation of the IAEA obligations agreed to by member states. Safeguards can only detect, not prevent, the diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons research, nor can safeguards prevent so-called "secret" nuclear facilities outside of safeguards. There are also several loopholes within the NPT which do not prohibit certain activities that may lead to the development of nuclear weapons. They include the research on the technology of non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, the establishment of reprocessing and enrichment plants for nuclear waste (which could in fact be used to turn nuclear waste into weapons grade material), and most notably, the ability to withdraw from the treaty if the state feels it is in its best interests. With regards to the last statement, all materials that were received while under the treaty are retained by the member state. A state could presumably position itself to build nuclear weapons while complying with all NPT provisions, and in fact has been done so, as seen in the nuclear program history of Iraq, a high-profile problem state.

The effectiveness of the IAEA, while heavily debated, can be resolved if the matter is properly analyzed. Since it's creation in 1957, only India, Pakistan, Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea have been found to have nuclear weapons programs and were considered de facto weapons states. Of these, both Iraq and South Africa have followed a policy of reversing their nuclear weapons. South Africa did so voluntarily upon signing the NPT while Iraq had to be forced to do so, losing many key nuclear facilities in the process. Both represent courses of action available to the IAEA. India and Pakistan are engaged in a standoff such that neither will acquiesce with NPT terms until the other does and as a result, continue to harbor nuclear weapons. However, talks have been held and different organizations, the IAEA included, have been promoting the idea of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The newcomer to the scene, North Korea, has made no indications of having a nuclear weapon, but has admitted to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA and the UN Security Council are trying to establish talks and will hopefully diplomatically resolve the issues at hand. The problem that arises from these cases is the problem of universality of the safeguards system. Through diplomatic negotiations, it is hoped that the NNWS that are not currently party to the NPT will change their ways, renounce their nuclear weapons programs and help promote nonproliferation policies.

The safeguards system of the IAEA is effective, and can be made more so given the proper authority, resources and backing. To those countries that have agreed to full-scope safeguards, the IAEA possesses the right to make special inspections with little notice. Inspections cost money and the IAEA has been operating on a zero-growth budget for a number of years. Other options include increasing the number of inspectors, as well as the number of inspections in order to more adequately gain access to information that could prevent fissionable material from being diverted to weapons production. The UN Security Council has declared that weapons of mass destruction are a threat to international peace and security and the IAEA has been successful in preventing many states from developing their own. In addition, the acceptance of full scope safeguards by the NWS would have a tremendous impact on the behavior of the NNWS and their actions towards the IAEA. Consistent, unconditional support is necessary for the IAEA to be able to function as it needs to.

History of the IAEA